Researchers Claim Big Tech Hinders Access to Crucial Data Under EU Law

New Delhi, India Jul 24, 2026 ALN: In the lead-up to Romania’s presidential election in November 2024, a surprising surge in TikTok accounts promoting a little-known politician named Calin Georgescu raised eyebrows. Previously focused on fashion and beauty, these accounts began disseminating Georgescu's hard-line views on immigration and anti-Semitic tropes, garnering 120 million views before the election. Georgescu, who had been polling in single digits, unexpectedly secured 23 percent of the vote in the first round.

This sudden rise in visibility for Georgescu was not just a random occurrence; it highlighted the intersection of social media influence and political campaigning in the modern era. As platforms like TikTok have become increasingly popular among younger demographics, they have also become battlegrounds for political narratives, where the rapid dissemination of content can significantly sway public opinion. The phenomenon raises questions about the responsibility of tech companies in regulating political content and the potential consequences of unchecked misinformation.

Adriana Iamnitchi, chair of computational social sciences at Maastricht University, closely monitored the situation. She aimed to investigate how TikTok monetized pro-Georgescu content through hidden influencer marketing and livestreamed political content. Iamnitchi's research was particularly timely, considering the implications of social media on democratic processes and the integrity of elections.

On October 28, 2025, just a month before the election, Iamnitchi and her team applied for access to TikTok’s Application Programming Interface (API) under the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA). The DSA was designed to enhance transparency and accountability in digital services, mandating that platforms provide researchers with access to data necessary for studying the impact of their services. However, their request was denied, with TikTok citing insufficient proof of their status as established researchers and failure to meet security requirements.

This denial underscores a broader issue faced by many researchers in the field of misinformation studies. Despite the DSA’s intentions to facilitate research, the practicalities of accessing data often remain fraught with challenges. The DSA was intended to empower researchers to investigate the effects of social media on society, yet the implementation has proven to be problematic, leaving many researchers in a state of frustration.

Two months after the application was denied, TikTok flagged 116,000 accounts as potentially compromised and took action against over 27,000 fake accounts linked to a third-party vendor promoting Georgescu and his party, the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR). TikTok claimed ignorance regarding the network's operators or origins, raising further questions about the platform's ability to monitor and manage the content disseminated through its service.

The first round of voting was annulled, and in the subsequent runoff in May 2025, independent candidate Nicușor Dan defeated AUR’s George Simion, who took over after Georgescu was barred from running again. Georgescu labeled the annulment a “formalized coup d’état” by Romania’s Constitutional Court. This incident illustrates the potential ramifications of social media influence on electoral integrity and public trust in democratic institutions.

Declassified intelligence indicated that Georgescu had received significant exposure and preferential treatment from TikTok, allegedly with Russian coordination behind the online campaign. This revelation points to the potential for foreign interference in domestic elections through social media platforms, raising alarms about the need for robust regulatory frameworks to protect electoral processes from manipulation.

Iamnitchi expressed frustration, stating that access to data could have allowed her team to identify the creators and beneficiaries of the pro-Georgescu content. “When you need data to investigate social media's impact on society, and that data is privately held, it becomes nearly impossible to conduct research,” she lamented. This sentiment is echoed by many in the academic community who are increasingly concerned about the implications of restricted access to data on public discourse and democratic accountability.

Many misinformation researchers, like Iamnitchi, report facing significant hurdles in obtaining platform data, despite being legally entitled to it under EU law. The law was recently expanded to enhance researcher access, but the implementation has proven problematic. Social media companies have increasingly restricted public access tools. For instance, Meta's CrowdTangle has been replaced with content libraries, and X has paywalled its API data, forcing academics to pay substantial fees. Researchers warn that without API access, the knowledge gap regarding how platforms handle content recommendations and sensitive reports will only widen, further complicating efforts to understand the dynamics of misinformation.

Some platforms, including TikTok, limit the number of posts researchers can access daily, complicating large-scale studies. The DSA was intended to facilitate access for vetted researchers, but two years post-implementation, many still struggle to meet security requirements. Application processes vary by platform, often requiring data to be stored on secure, isolated infrastructure—a resource many universities lack. Even those who gain approval face challenges, as the quality of the data can be inconsistent, complicating verification processes.

According to DSA40 data, of 46 tracked applications, 20 were approved and 14 rejected, with TikTok approving 11 of 13 applications while X rejected 11 of 23. The actual rejection rate is likely higher due to reliance on voluntary reporting. This disparity in approval rates raises concerns about the equitable treatment of researchers across different platforms and the implications for the overall research landscape.

“There's no structured advantage for researchers to use this pathway,” noted L. K. Seiling, coordinator of the DSA40 Collaboratory. “Data access as it’s currently set up disincentivizes researchers.” This observation highlights the need for a reevaluation of the access mechanisms in place to ensure that researchers can effectively contribute to the understanding of social media’s impact on society.

A TikTok spokesperson claimed the platform has granted access to over 1,500 research teams and approved 130 applications in the EU recently, asserting compliance with the DSA. Meta defended its new tools as comprehensive and robust in privacy protections. However, these claims must be scrutinized against the backdrop of ongoing challenges faced by researchers attempting to navigate the complex landscape of data access.

With limited workarounds, researchers often resort to scraping data from platforms that allow it, a tedious process that fails to capture complete follower lists, hindering the mapping of disinformation networks. This reliance on scraping underscores the inadequacies of current data access frameworks and the urgent need for more transparent and accessible data-sharing practices.

Legal challenges are another avenue for researchers. After X rejected a request from Democracy Reporting International (DRI) to study political discourse ahead of Germany's federal election, DRI sued and won a ruling that could set a precedent. However, they faced further challenges with another request, highlighting the inconsistencies in EU law application. The legal landscape surrounding data access and research rights remains complex and fraught with uncertainty, necessitating ongoing advocacy for clearer guidelines and protections for researchers.

In December 2025, the European Commission fined X €120 million for creating barriers to researcher access, undermining research into various risks in the EU. Following this, X accepted an action plan to improve the researcher screening process and lift restrictions on data scraping. This development signals a potential shift in the regulatory environment, but it remains to be seen how effectively these changes will be implemented in practice.

While Allen of DRI views this as a positive step, he remains skeptical about the implementation. The EU has also begun discussions with platforms to establish new standards for vetting researchers, aiming to enhance access to nonpublic data for studying systemic risks. These discussions are crucial for shaping a more conducive environment for research in the digital age.

The new regulations could compel X to disclose full follower lists, providing researchers with clearer insights into coordinated disinformation campaigns. This data would enable them to analyze interactions and amplification patterns among accounts, a crucial step in understanding the spread of misinformation online. As the landscape of social media continues to evolve, the need for rigorous research and analysis will only grow, making the accessibility of data a vital issue for policymakers, researchers, and society at large.